Azimuth Legal
R v McCafferty & Ors [2026] UKSC 20 (14 July 2026)
Executive summary
The Supreme Court considered whether section 78(1)(b)(ii) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 covers obstruction of access to private business premises reached by a private road. It held that the public at large does not have a right to enter or leave private premises merely because employees, customers, or suppliers may do so, so the second limb of the offence was not engaged on the facts described.
Key points
- Parties: R (Respondent) v McCafferty and others (Appellants); appeal from [2025] EWCA Crim 748.
- Issue: whether access to and egress from private business premises is a 'right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large' under section 78(1)(b)(ii).
- Holding: no; a private road and private premises are distinguished from highways because the public at large has no general right to use them.
- Reasoning: the Crown did not rely on the 'serious harm' limb in section 78(1)(b)(i), and the Court said obstruction of a private way can only fall within that limb if it creates or risks serious harm.
- Facts: protesters blocked vehicles at the Müller UK site on Pointon Way for around four hours during an Animal Rebellion protest.
- Sanctions/export-control angle: none addressed in the judgment; the case is about protest-related public nuisance and the statutory scope of obstruction offences.
Why it matters
The decision narrows the reach of the new statutory public nuisance offence when protesters block access to private industrial or commercial sites. For national-security and sovereign-risk audiences, it signals that enforcement must fit the statute closely: obstruction of private logistics or facility access will not automatically satisfy the 'public at large' limb.
Implications
For compliance and litigation strategy, prosecutors cannot rely on section 78(1)(b)(ii) simply because workers, suppliers, or customers use a private site; they must show a public-at-large right or proceed under the serious-harm limb. Defendants facing similar charges have a stronger argument to attack indictments that frame private-site access as public-right obstruction rather than as serious-harm public nuisance.
- Parties: R (Respondent) v McCafferty and others (Appellants); appeal from [2025] EWCA Crim 748.
- Issue: whether access to and egress from private business premises is a 'right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large' under section 78(1)(b)(ii).
- Holding: no; a private road and private premises are distinguished from highways because the public at large has no general right to use them.
- Reasoning: the Crown did not rely on the 'serious harm' limb in section 78(1)(b)(i), and the Court said obstruction of a private way can only fall within that limb if it creates or risks serious harm.
- Facts: protesters blocked vehicles at the Müller UK site on Pointon Way for around four hours during an Animal Rebellion protest.
- Sanctions/export-control angle: none addressed in the judgment; the case is about protest-related public nuisance and the statutory scope of obstruction offences.
The decision narrows the reach of the new statutory public nuisance offence when protesters block access to private industrial or commercial sites. For national-security and sovereign-risk audiences, it signals that enforcement must fit the statute closely: obstruction of private logistics or facility access will not automatically satisfy the 'public at large' limb.