R (SP) v The First-tier Tribunal [2026] UKUT 221 (AAC) (11 June 2026)

Executive summary

The Upper Tribunal dismissed SP’s judicial review of the First-tier Tribunal’s refusal to reopen her Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme award under paragraph 115(b) of the 2012 Scheme. It held that the FtT had erred by not expressly finding whether her condition had become permanent, but the error was not material because the evidence did not support permanence or the higher tariff level needed for an increased award. The Tribunal also found no procedural unfairness in the FtT’s decision not to seek further medical evidence.

Key points

• Applicant: SP; Interested Party: the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority; judicial review of a FtT decision in a criminal injuries compensation case.
• Core issue: whether there had been a “material change” in SP’s medical condition allowing reopening under paragraph 115(b) of the 2012 Scheme.
• FtT had found no material change between acceptance of the September 2022 award and the June 2023 reopening request.
• Upper Tribunal accepted there was an error of law because permanence is a key tariff distinction under Part A of Annex E and should have been addressed.
• Error was not material: the evidence did not establish permanence or the higher degree of disablement required for an increased award.
• No procedural impropriety arose from the FtT’s failure to obtain additional medical evidence.

Why it matters

The decision narrows the practical route to reopening a settled compensation award where an applicant relies on a later diagnosis or re-labelling of a psychiatric condition. For risk and compliance audiences, it shows that tribunals will require evidence of a genuinely material deterioration or permanence before disturbing finality, rather than treating a new diagnosis alone as enough.

Implications

For claimants, the case underscores the need to put forward clear medical evidence addressing permanence and tariff movement at the reopening stage; a later diagnosis without proof of material change is unlikely to succeed. For authorities and litigators, it supports a finality-first approach under paragraph 115(b) and indicates that failure to expressly deal with permanence may be an error, but not one that will justify intervention absent evidence that the outcome could realistically have been different.